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Abstract
We seek to provide fairly general conditions that may be imposed on
parameters in order that any empirical consumer demand system is
consistent with utility maximization. In standard demand systems the
imposition of these regularity conditions is less essential than in more
complex situations, like when there is rationing or when there are
endogenously switching regimes. The paper starts out by giving a number of
examples where the failure to properly take into account restrictions
following from neoclassical theory leads to models that are not internally
coherent.
Let 0 be the space of parameters which generate internally coherent
models. We show that even if the true parameter vector belongs to O,
failure to constrain the parameter estimates to 0 in "maximum likelihood"
estimation may yield inconsistent estimates outside of O.
Next a general framework is provided in which it is possible to
formulate parameter restrictions which guarantee utility consistent
models. For various cases (standard demand systems, rationing, endogenous
regimes) we suggest general conditions that can be imposed in order to
guarantee coherency of the empirical model. Since random parameter
variation is allowed for, to capture non-systematic differences in
preferences across individuals, the conditions also imply restrictions on
the stochastic specification of an empirical model. For a number of
familiar demand systems we show what the parameter restrictions amount to
in practice.- 2 -
1. Introduction
Empirical researchers in the fíeld of demand theory are becoming
increasingly aware of the tight structure that may be imposed on their
models by neoclassical theory. In the somewhat older literature on demand
systems a typical approach would be to choose a particular representation
of preferences and derive the corresponding demand functions. After
tacking on an error term, the system would next be estimated. In the
estimation, restrictions from neoclassical theory might or might not be
imposed. In either case authors often have tested the various Slutsky
conditions for their particular empirical specification, with mixed
results. As noted by McElroy (1987) the attention for consistency with
neoclassical theory has mostly been limíted to the systematic part of the
demand equations, with a rather cavalier treatment of the error structure.
Her own work is a notable exception in this respect.
Whether or not authors would severely test neoclassical restrictions
for their data set, it seems fair to say that in a standard demand system
the empirical specification is rather loosely connected with the
underlying theory. If the estimation results turn out to be inconsistent
with a utility maximization hypothesis, one can still regard the empirical
model as an adequate description of reality. This is no longer true in
more complicated situations where the theory is used more intensively. In
models dealing with rationing, corner solutions, nonlinear budget
constraints, or endogenously switching regimes, utility theory plays a
more crucial role than in traditional demand systems. If in these models
Slutsky restrictions are violated they will in general not be internally
coherent, in the sense that probabilities of mutually exclusive events do
not sum to unity or that an endogenous variable is not determined
unambiguously by the model (c.f. e.g. Gourieroux et al., 198o and Schmidt,
1981).
To avoid these types of problems one has to place appropriate
restrictions on the parameters appearing in the model. Furthermore,
special care has to be taken with the specification of the error
structure. In this paper we provide various examples of problems arising
if neoclassical restrictions are not imposed properly. Next we propose
conditions that guarantee internal coherency of the model given the-3-
phenomenon one wants to model (a standard demand equation, rationing, or
switching regimes). We apply the conditions to a number of frequently used
specifications of preferences and show how the conditions can be imposed
in practice.
In most of our analysis concavity of the expenditure function plays
an important role. (We will alternatively denote this as concavity of the
cost function or simply as "negativity"). The vast majority of the
specifications of preference structures considered in the literature only
satisfy concavity of the expenditure function locally. Those that are
capable of satisfying concavity globally, are in general quite
restrictive. The only flexible form that can satisfy negativity globally
is the generalized McFadden cost function proposed by Diewert and Wales
(1987). See also Sarnett and Lee (1985) and Barnett (1983).
Of course, the importance of concavity for the behavior of a
neoclassical model in non-standard situations has been noted before. For
example, Ransom (1987a) has noted that the Wales and Woodland (1983) model
of a stochastic consumer demand system with binding non-negativity
constraints is well-behaved if the parameters satisfy certain regularity
conditions, which are closely connected to concavity of the cost function.
However, as will be seen in Section 4 below, the imposition of concavity
for the quadratic utility specification of Wales and Woodland in a
relevant area of the price space requires a rather intricate stochastic
specification. Similarly, Hausman (1985) notes the importance of
negativity to have a well-behaved model of behavior under a kinked budget
constraint. In his case imposition of concavity is rather simple. See
Section 2. Van Soest and Kooreman (~g86, ~987) have noted that the
approach of Lee and Pitt (1986) to stochastic consumer demand systems via
the use of shadow prices leads in general to incoherent models unless
certain conditions are imposed on the parameters. These conditions are
closely related to concavity of the cost function.
In Section 2 we give three examples of, respectively, kinked budget
constraints, rationing, and endogenous regimes, which all highlight the
crucial role played by concavity to obtain an internally coherent model.
To stress the importance of coherency we conclude Section 2 with an
example of a simultaneous probit model where failure to impose coherency
conditions in "maximum likelihood" estimation yields inconsistent4
estimates of the parameters, even though the true parameters satisfy
coherency conditions. Section 3 introduces notation and some basic
concepts. It also provides three conditions that can be imposed on
standard demand systems. The conditions are applied to some often used
preference specifications. It is argued however that such conditions can
often be ignored if one is willing to make sufficiently general
assumptions about the errors in the model.
Section 4 considers the case of rationing and provides conditions
that can be imposed on the parameters in order to guarantee an internally
coherent model. The conditions are elaborated for the same specifications
of preferences as considered in Section 3. In Section 5 we consider
internal coherency of models with endogenous regimes. The conditíons are
quite similar to the ones given in Section 4. Again applications to some
popular demand systems are given. Section 6 concludes.5
2. Concavity and Coherency. Four examples
2.1 Kinked budget constraints
Figure 2.1 illustrates the simplest possible case of a standard model
of individual labor supply in the presence of kinked budget constraints,
as developed by Hausman in numerous papers ( see, e.g., Hausman,
1981,1985). Given the budget constraint, the individual chooses the number






Figure 2.1 Individual labor supply and kinked budget constraints
A typical utility specification used in this kind of work is
U(h,c) - (J3h-a)exp{J3(h-,y-J3c)~(a-Sh)} , (2.1)
where h is the number of hours worked per period and c is total
consumption. Note that U is an increasing function of c if p~0. Along each
linear segment of the budget curve, this utility function implies linear
labor supply functions of the form
h~ - aw~t gY~t ?l (J-1,2), (2.2)where wj is (minus) the slope of the j-th segment, yj is the intercept of
the j-th segment with the line h-0, and hj is the desired number of hours
if the wage rate is wj and non-labor income is yj.
With (2.2) corresponds an indirect utility function of the form
~(wj.Yj) - exP(l~ wj){~32yjt apwj- a; ë~}
If the direct utility function ís strictly quasi-concave on the whole
budget set, then the optimum h~` can easily be found with (2.2). There are
five possibilities:
A. hl C 0 h~ - 0
B. 0( hl t h0 h" - hl
C. h2C h0 C
hl hM - h0
D. h0( h2 ~ T h" - h2
E. T~ h2 hM - T.
(2.3)
To allow for unobserved preference variation, assume that g is a
random variable defined on the real line. Hausman (1981) and Blomquist
(1983) assume that J3 is negative with probability one. For a~0 this
guarantees quasi-concavity of U at all points of the budget set. In this
example we show what can happen if the concavity problem is neglected and
(3 is allowed to be positive but nevertheless (2.3) is applied. The
following probabilities to the five cases in (2.3) can be assigned:
Pr[A] - Pr[g((-awl-y)~Y1]
Pr[B] - Pr[(-awl-Y)~Yl~fl~(-awl-X t h0)~Y1]
Pr[C] - Pr[(-awl-?l t h0)~Yl~fl~(-aw2-7l ~ h0)~Y2]
Pr[D] - Pr[(-aw2-y t h0)~Y2~f~~(-aw2-ë t T)~Y2]
Pr[E] - Pr[(-aw2-~ t T)~Y2~f3]
Let the parameter values be a-20, y-0 and let the budget constraint
be characterized by w1-1, w2-1~2, y1-1, y2-11, T-40, so h0-20 and c0-21.
Then we can identify the five cases with segments of the S-axis as
follows.A B C D
~~~ ~~( ~~( ~~C
E
-------------~-------------------~-------~---------~----------------
-20 0 10~11 30~11 p
Thus, given a distributional assumption regarding p, the calculation of
the probabilities is straightforward.
Now consider a second set of perameter values: a-10, ~r-0 with the
same budget constraint as in the example above. The corresponding segments
of the p-axis are as follows.
B
A ~( ~~
-~~ ~ D ~ ~ E
( ~ ~ C
------I---------------I--------I----------------I----------------------
-10 15~11 35~11 10
(C - as)
Clearly, the model is now not internally coherent, in the sense that
probabilities do not sum to unity. In other words: From (2.3), it is not
possible to write h~ as a function of p. To see the root of the trouble,
notice that quasi-concavity of the direct utility function (or
equivalently negativity, i.e. concavity of the expenditure function)
requires a~ ph~. Using (2.2) it is easy to verify that concavity is
satisfied at the kink point for both hl and h2 for the first set of
parameter values but not for the second. In fact, the inequality
(h0- awl- Il)~Y1~ (h0- aw2- X)~Y2 . (2.4)
which is required to avoid the incoherency, is equivalent to concavity at
h0 for both line segments. This can be shown straightforwardly as follows:
Assume that yl and y2 are both positive and use the relation
yl} hOwl - y2} hOw2-
c0. Then (2.4) can be simplified to8
ay2 ~ (h~- aw2- y)h~ . (2.5)
If, being on segment 2, the individual chooses h~, this implies
p-(h~- a w2- y)~y2. Inserting this in (2.5) yields a~~3 h~, which is
the concavity condition at h~ (with p such that h~ is the optimum in case
of the linear budget constraint characterized by w2 and y2). A completely
similar argument shows that if ~ is such that h~ is the preferred point
along segment 1, the same condition follows from (2.4). One can also work
backwards from the concavity condition to (2.5) which establishes the
equivalence. In conclusion, concavity at the kink point is necessary and
sufficient to avoid problems of incoherency.
This example can be seen as a simple example of a model with
endogenous regimes due to a set of inequality constraints. The general
framework is discussed in Section 5. One of the goals of this paper is to
discuss methods of avoiding the problems with internal coherency as
encountered in the example. In this specific example there are two
apparent ways of avoiding problems.
The first option is the restriction of the range of possible
realizations of the random variable p and the value of the fixed parameter
a. If p is negative with probability one and a is nonnegative, the
problems do not arise. The reason for this is the fact that in this case
the concavity condition a)~h is satisfied for all nonnegative h.
Another possibility, which avoids truncation of the distributíon of
(3, is to impose (2.5) for all 'relevant' values of h~ and c~. Notice that
(2.5) can be rewritten as
ac~ ~ (h0- X)h~ (2.5')
Thus, if the fixed parameters a and ~r are restricted such that (2.5')
holds for all relevant (h~,c~) (e.g. all (h~,c~) in the sample), the
coherency problem is avoided. In a sense, the latter method is less
restrictive than the first one, because it does not necessarily imply
quasi-concavity of the direct utility function at all points of the budget
set.9
2.2 Non-negativity constraints in the Translog demand system
Lee and Pitt (1986) consider a Translog demand system with binding
non-negativity constraints:
n




D- -1 t~ ~ p ij log vj
i-1 j-1
pij : parameters ( i,j-1,...,n)
n : number of goods
vj : pj~y with pj the price of j-th good ( j-1,...,n) and y income
si : budget share of good i
a. : random parameters (i-1,...,n), representing random preferences,
i
alt....f an - -1.
The demand regime where the first R goods are not consumed is
characterized by the conditions





ni(v) : virtual price (or 'shadow price') of the i-th good
v: vector of market prices of the goods consumed in positive amounts
x.: demand for the i-th good given that the first R goods are not
i
consumed.
The various regimes correspond to different values of the ai
(i-1,...,n). Lee and Pitt (1986) characterize the regimes by solving the
a, from (2.6) and (2.7).
i
Van Soest and Kooreman (1987) construct examples for n-3. Figure 2.2
gives one such example.- 10 -
al
Figure 2.2 Internal coherency in the Translog demand system
with binding non-negativity constraints
1 2 0
Let
B-~l~i'~i, 1,.., - 2 4 0 and v- ( 1,1,1 )'.
~ ~- 3 0 0 1
Figure 2.2 shows the number of solutions of (2.~), for each realization of
the vector a-(al,a2,-1-a1-a2)' of random variables. Each solution is
characterized by some regime, i.e. a subset of {1,2,3} indicating which
constraints are binding.
The figure indicates for each vector a those regimes that yield a
solution. For a with al)0 and ~2C2a1, no solution is found and for other
a's (except for some set of probability zero) there are two solutions,
implying that different regimes occur simultaneously. This would imply
that the probabilities with which each regime occurs do not sum to unity.- 11 -
For other parameter values, i.e. different values of gi~, such
problems need not arise. Van Soest and Kooreman give sufficient conditions
to avoid the incoherency. It turns out that these same conditions also
guarantee concavity of the cost function for all feasible values of the
budget shares of the n goods. Thus, a strong connection is suggested
between concavity of the cost function and internal coherency of the
demand system.
2.3 Rationing





The 2x2 submatrix of second order derivatives with respect to pl and p2 is
- 1 1~2 v2 exp(vl) v2exp(vl)
p3 v2 exp(vl) exp(vl)texp(v2)
where v1-P1~P3, v2-P2~P3.
This matrix is negative definite for vl~v2.
The demand functions, derived by application of Shephard's Lemma, are
ql - -1~2 v2 exp(vl) t -- (2.9a)
q2 - -v2exp(vl) - exp(v2) t a2 (2.9b)
Suppose now that ql is rationed at q1- ql. We know from rationing
theory ( c.f., e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), that q2 is then obtained
by first solving vl from (2.9a), for given v2 and q1-q1, and inserting the
solution (vl, say) in (2.9b). Let us assume that q1- -lt al. This is a
perfectly feasible value; it is generated by, for instance, v1-1og 2,
v2-1, so that vlCv2 and negativity is satisfied.- 12 -
Now assume however that q1- -1 t al and v2- 1~2.
Then we find v1- log 8) v2. Hence there does not exist a shadow price vl
for which the cost function is concave, even although both ql and v2 are
perfectly feasible. It is the combination q1- -1 f al and v2- 1~2 which
causes problems.
This example shows that the relationship between negativity and the
existence of a well-behaved solution of the rationing problem may be
rather intricate.
2.4 Incoherency and ML-estimation
We consider the following simultaneous Probit-model ( See e.g.
Schmidt, 1981).
.
yl - Alx t Illy2 t E 1
. Y2 - H2x ~ ~2y1 } s2
yi - 1 if yi ) 0 and yi - 0 if yi C 0 (i-1,2)
(2.10)
Here x denotes an (observable) exogenous variable, yi and y2 are latent
endogenous variables, yl and y2 are observed endogenous variables and el
and e2 are random variables following a bivariate normal distribution:
l E 2J ~ N( l OJ ~ l 0 OJ )
It is straightforward to derive the probabilities of the four
different outcomes which are possible:
Pr[y1-o, Y2-o] - ~(-alx) ~(-~2x).
Pr[y1-o, Y2-1] - ~(-l~lx-~1) ~(-s2x).
Pr[Y1-1. Y2-0] - ~(-plx) ~(-g2x-~2), and
Pr[Y1-1. Y2-1] - ~(-gix-~1) ~(-S2x-112).
where ~ denotes the standard normal distribution function.- 13 -
In general, these four probabilities do not sum to one. In fact,
their sum equals
1 t [~(Rlx'ël) - ~(R1)] [~(R2x4ë2) - ~ÍR2)] (2.12)
so that a condition for coherency is that y1y2-0. This renders the model
recursive (cf. Schmidt, 1981). The condition given here is just a special
case of the coherency conditions given by Gourieroux et al. (1980).
Let us now assume that the 'true' parameters of the data generating
process are given by
J31-1, á1--1. R2-0, and y2-0 (2.13)
Note that ~2-0 implies that the true model is coherent. Furthermore, we
assume that the exogenous variable x is a dummy variable with value 1 for
half of the observations and value 0 for the other half. Inserting the






For a sample of 2T observations, T with x-0 and T with x-1, let K(i,j,k)
be the number of observations with y1-i, y2-j and x-k (i,j,k E{0,1}).
Note that
plim {K(i,j,k)~T} - Pr[y1-i,y2-j~x-k] (i,j,k E {0,1}).
T~
Although the meaning of the concept 'Maximum Likelihood Estimator' is
cumbersome in a model which is not internally coherent, application of the
ML-technique is possible without imposing coherency. Our purpose is to
show that the resulting estimator for the parameter R2 is inconsistent.
Because of the assumption that E1 and e2 are independent. the log-
'likelihood' function based on (2.11) can be written in the following
form:
L(R1.R2.?11,Y2) - L1(fil,ál) t L2(R2,á2).- 14 -
where
1 1




L2(p2,ë2) -~ K(i,0.k) log ~(-p2k-112i) f~ K(j,l.k) log ~Íp2ktá2j).
i,k-0 i,k-0
Maximization of L is thus achieved by maximizing L1(with respect to pland
yl) and L2 (with respect to p2alid y2) separately. This means that the two
simultaneous Probit-equations are treated as if they were separate Probit-
equations, i.e. application of the ML-technique implicitly assumes that y2
is exogenous in the first equation and yl is exogenous in the second
equation. Since the true value of y2 is 0, y2 is independent from E1 and
there is nothing wrong in estimating the parameters of the first equation
in this way, i.e. the estimates for pl and ~1 are consistent. The
estimates for p2 and ~r2 however are inconsistent, as can be shown by a
straightforward computation of their probability limits: In the limiting
case (T-~), the sample fractions K(i,j,k)~T equal the probabilities given
by (2.14) and L2~T can be written as
L2(p2,à'2)~T- 0.250 1og ~(o) t o.079 log ~(-p2) t 0.250 1og ~(-ó2) t
0.421 1og ~(-p2-y2) t o.421 log ~(o) t 0.250 1og ~(p2) t
0.079 log ~(~-2) t o.250 log ~(p2t~2).
The maximum of this expression can easily be found numerically; it is
attained for p2-0.5726 and y2--o.8405. Thus we have
plim p2 - 0.5726 ~ 0- p2 and plim y2 --0.8405 ~ 0- y2.
T-~ T-~
Finally, note that if the restriction ~2- 0 is imposed (such that internal
coherency is guaranteed) then the estimate for p2 is consistent:
L2(p2,0) is maximized for
p2- -~-1({K(U,0,1)tK(1,0,1)}~{K(0,0,1)4K(0,1,1)tK(1,0,1)4K(1,1,1)})- 15 -
so plim ~32 - -~-1 (0.5) - o - ~32.
T-~
The example shows that Maximum Likelihood estimation is not
appropriate if internal coherency is not guaranteed for all values in the
parameter space on which the likelihood function is to be maximized. Even
if the model is internally coherent for the true parameter values, the ML-
technique may yield inconsistent estimates and can lead to the conclusion
that the model is not internally coherent: For a large enough sample, the
null hypothesis y1~2- 0 would be rejected using standard methods of
statistical inference. Moreover, the example shows that even the estimates
of parameters which have no direct relation to the internal coherency
condition (p2 in the example) can be inconsistent. It thus makes clear
that internal coherency is a conditio sine qua non for the use of Maximum
Likelihood.
O
The fourth example underlines the importance of imposing appropriate
coherency conditions in the estimation of limited dependent variable
models. Since the first three examples suggest a strong connection between
concavity and coherency, we now first consider a framework which allows
for the imposition of concavity in the estimation of neoclassical models.- 16 -
3. Well-behaved demand functions
This section provides a description of a general framework for the
estimation of a demand system which is consistent with utility maximizing
behavior. We first introduce some notation and standard regularity
conditions. Next we consider restrictions on the parameter space that may
be imposed in estimation in order to ensure that the estimated system
satisfies the regularity conditions. Finally, some examples are given of
the imposition of the parameter restrictions in the estimation of some
well-known demand systems.
3.1 Regularity conditions
We assume that each individual maximizes some direct utility function
subject to a linear budget constraint. Topics such as rationing and non-
negativity constraints are discussed in later sections.We start from an
indirect utility function vs given by
u- v~(p,y) ((p,y) E Vg C Rn x R),
where p-(p ,..,pn)' is a vector of prices of n commodities,
y denotes income (or total expenditures on the n commodities),
u is the utility level, and
3 E O C Rm is a vector of (fixed or random) parameters.
Standard regularity conditions for given J E O are:
A1. vg is homogeneous of degree 0:
for all (p,y) E Vg and a E R}, (~p,ay) E V'g and vg(ap,ay) - vg(p,y).
A2. v~ is twice continuously differentiable with respect to prices and
income and for all (p,y) E VR, (~v~~~y)(p,y) ) 0.
Assumption A2 implies that vg is strictly increasing in y and allows for
the introduction of the expenditure or cost function eg on the set
Ég- {(p,v9(p,y)); (p,y) E Vg}, e9 is implicitly defined by- 1~ -
~'~(P.eg(P.u)) - u ((P.u) E ~9).
The dual approach is only consistent with utilit;~ maximizing behavior if
'strict' concavity is guaranteed. More precisely: es is said to be regular
at given (p,u) E És if the nxn matrix (~2eg~~p~p')(p,u) is negative semi-
definite and of rank n-1. v~ is said to regular at (p,y) E V~ if eg is
regular at (p,v8(p,y)). With these definitions the third regularity
condition can be formulated:
A3. vg is regular at all (p,y) E Vg.
In what follows we work with a convex subset V~ of V~, where for all
points in Vg the conditions A1-A3 are satisfied. Vg is referred to as the
regular set in (p,y)-space.
Uncompensated demand functions on V~ are derived using Roy's identity:
9 - Fs(P.Y) ( (P.Y) E Ve).
Here q-(ql,...,qn)' is a vector of (not necessarily non-negative)
quantities and the components of the vector-valued function Fg are given
by
F~ i(P,Y) - -(~~s~~Pi)(P.Y) ~ (~~g~~Y)(P,Y) (i- 1,....n).
The regular set in q-space, Qa C Rn, is defined as
Qg - {FS(P.Y): (P,Y) E Vg}.
If vg satisfies A1 and A3, then F~ is homogeneous of degree zero and one-
to-one from {(p,l) E Vg} onto Q8. (See, e.g., Gale and Nikaido, 1965)- 18 -
3.2 Parameterization and restrictions in the parameter space
Preference variation between different individuals can be
incorporated in the parameter vector 9. For each individual t, we write
st - gt(W.nt) .
Here w is a vector (or matrix) of fixed parameters (with the same value
for all individuals) and the vectors ~t are independent drawings from some
probability distribution which does not depend on t. The (vector-valued)
function gt may depend on t through a vector xt of observed individual
characteristics. The most obvious example is
~t - gt(w,nt) - w xt t nt .
where y~ is a matrix of y~i~'s. Thus, systematic preference variation is
allowed for if gt depends on t, whereas the presence of the ~t's implies
random variation of preferences.
In estimating the system of demand equations, the following
conditions may be imposed on the admissible values of y and~or on the set
S2 of all possible realizations of the ~t's.
B1. (Regularity in a minimal subset of (p,y)-space)
For all t, for all admissible y and ~, E Q: Vg (~ n) ~ Vmin'
t
This condition states that for all parameter values (and thus for all
possible individual structures of preferences) the model must be able to
explain behavior for at least some minimal subset of (p,y)-space. It
implies that the parameter space 0 cannot be 'too large'; otherwise there
might be values of y or ~,t such that at some points of
Vmin
the regularity
conditions A1-A3 are not all satisfied.
Vmin
can, for instance, be
rectangular:
Vmin- {(P,Y) E Rnx R ; (P,y) ~ (P,Y) ~ (P.Y)},
for given values p,y,p,y.- i9 -
B2. ('External coherency')
Let, for all t, VQt be a given subset of {(p,y,q) E RnxRxRn; p'q - y}.
Then for all t, for ell admissible y and (p,y,q} E VQt, there is an ~,
E S2 such that Fgt(W n)(p,y) - q.
One can think of VQt as the set of prices, incomes and quantities which
may arise for observation t. For example, if no measurement or
optimization errors are involved, VQt must at least contain the observed
(p,y,q)-vector for individual t. In fact, VQt may then consist of just one
point. Condition B2 states that the parameter space cannot be too small.
The random preferences must allow so much flexibility that for all
admissible W and at least one possible value of n a given (observed)
quantity vector is optimal for given prices and income. This motivates the
term "external coherency": The model has to be coherent with available
data, or in other words the likelihood contribution of any given data
point should be strictly positive. If ineasurement errors are present, the
condition may be omitted.
B3. (Regularity in a minimal subset of q-space)
For all t, for all admissible w and n E 52: Q ~ Q .
gt(y.r~) min
This condition states that, for given (fixed and random) parameter values,
certain quantity vectors must be optimal for some prices and income. As
long as the issue of rationing ( and shadow prices) is not addressed, we
might do without this condition.
3.3 ~~Ples
Example 1: Linear Expenditure System (LES)
The indirect utility function is defined for positive prices:
~ (P.Y) - (Y - P~ó) ÍÍ p -~ . (3.1)
g k.l k-20-
n
with ~ ai -
i-1
1, ai) 0 (i-1,.. .n). P - (P1... .Pn)'. á - (ó1... ,~n)'.
The expenditure function is
n ak
ea.?l(P.u)
- P'Y t u ÍÍ pk .
k-1
A typical element of the matrix of second order derivatives is
{(~2egI~P~P')(P.u)}i.j
- P P { ÏÍ pk~ } {aiaj - óijai} ,
i ~ k-1
with óij- 1 if i-j, áij- 0 if i~ j.
Given the assumptions on the oci, this matrix is negative semi-definite if
and only if u~ 0. In view of (3.1) this requires y- p'y ~ 0 so that a
maximal choice for the regular set is given by
va~ó-
{(P.Y); P) 0 and y- P'ó ~ 0}.
The uncompensated demand functions are
qi- Fg i(P.Y) - ?lit (ai~Pi)(Y - P'1l) (3-2)
From the definition of QS it is easy to see that the corresponding regular
region in q-space is given by
Qa,ó
-{q E Rn; q) Y}.
Random preferences can be incorporated as follows:
~t - ~t,0} ~t '
where ~t,0- (Yt1,0 ""'~tn,0)~
is fixed ( and may depend on personal
characteristics of individual t) and
nt- (~tl " "'~tn)~
is random (with a
distribution that does not depend on t).- 21 -
We elaborate the conditions B1 through B3:
B1. The random variable r~t should be restricted such that y- ytp ) 0 for
all (p,y) E
Vmín'
If, for instance, we take
Vmin
to be the rectangle
Vmin -{(P.Y); 0~ p~ p, 0~ y ~ y},
then the ~,'s have to satisfy
max p'n ~ -max max- p'?1t,0 ,
O(p~p t O(pCp
which then defines the largest possible 4 for given
ót,0's'
B2. Solving y from (3.2) yields
(3.3)
yi - qi -~ ai,pi
(i-1,...,n), for some arbitrary ~~ 0.
If we define VQt as
{(Pt'yt'qt)}
(with ptqt- yt), then S2 has to be
large enough to contain for each t at least one value of ~, in the set
{~, E Rn ; Tti- qti- ~ ai~pti- yti,0 ( i-1,...,n) for some ~) 0} .
Note that if 4 is chosen according to (3.3), condition B2 is always
satisfied (choose ~ large enough). As said before, if we allow for
measurement or optimization errors, condition B2 need not be imposed.
B3. We may want to define Qmin as the set {q; q~ q}, with q some given
vector, so that the ~'s have to satisfy y~ q, or equivalently
~~ q-~t,0
for all t. If one wants to impose B1 and B3
simultaneously, this condition has to be imposed jointly with (3.3).
It may be illuminating to discuss the role of the three conditions in the
estimation of the Linear Expenditure System a little bit further. Suppose
we do not allow for measurement errors. Then B1 and B3 imply restrictions
on the range of the random variables ~ which depend on parameters implicit
in yt~0. This in itself may give rise to non-standard estimation problems.For the rest, however, the imposition of B1 and B3 (and the fact that B2
can always be satisfied) makes sure that whatever our estimates will be,
the resulting model is always consistent with neoclassical theory. Also,
since B2 is satisfied the likelihood is well-defined for all data points.
Example 2: Quadratic Direct Utility Function (QDU)
The direct utility function is given by
U(q) - ó'q - 1~2 q~B q




The utility function has ~ satiation point at q- B-l~r, with corresponding
utility level u- 1~2 ~r'B-ly. The demand functions are given by
q -
g-1~,
- (P~B-1P)-1{ó~B-1P - y} B-lp
and the indirect utility function is thus given by
~(P,Y) - 1~2 {y'B-1~, - (P~B-1P)-1Ló~B-1P - y]2}.
The indirect utility function is increasing in y as long as the satiation
point is not in the budget set, i.e. as long as y C,y'B-lp. Homogeneity of
degree zero is satisfied automatically.
The expenditure function is given by
eB,7l(P,u)
- ó 'B-1P - (P~B-1P)1,2LD'',B-ly - 2u]1,2.
The Hessian of the expenditure function is
(~2eg~~P~P~)(P.u)-(P~B-1P)1,2LY~B-ly-2u]1,ZL(P~B-1P)-1(B-1P)ÍB-lp)~-B-1].-23-
As one would expect, e(p,u) is only defined for u C 1~2 ~'B-ly (i.e. for u
less than or equal to the satiation level) and p~ 0. It is easy to show
that, since B is positive definite, the matrix
(P'B-1P)-1(B-1P)(B-lp)~-B-1
is negative semi-definite and of rank n-1. Hence, the cost function is
concave for u ( 1~2 ,y'B-1~.
In what follows, we assume that there is one commodity, say the n-th,
for which the price is always positive, i.e. pn) 0.
This suggests the following choice for VB ~,:
VB.ó-
{(P,Y); Y ~ Jl'B-1P, Pn) 0}.
Let us consider the following stochastic specification ( see, e.g.,
Ransom, 1987b) :
~t - ~t,0} ~t '
' is fixed, and ~, - (~ .. ~, )' is a where
~1t,0- (yt1,0 " " 'ytn,0) t tl " ' tn
vector of random variables with
ntn- 0'
The elaboration of B1 - B3 is as follows.




as for LES, this condition turns into
min n'B-lp ) y- min min yt~OB-lp
O~pCp - t O~pCp
(3.5)
which is then again the definition of Q. It is quite similar to the
corresponding condition (3.3) for LES.
B2. Again, let us define VQt as {(Pt'yt'qt)}'
Solving ~, from the demand
functions yields-24-
n p
nl - pti ,ytn,0- Yti,O t~ {~ij- ptl ~nj} qtj
tn j-1 tn
and 52 should be big enough to contain the n's obtained in this way for
all t, and for all values of yt~0 and S in the admissible parameter
space.
B3. Inversion of the demand system for given parameter values (including
~r) yields shadow prices and corresponding virtual income as a function
of q:
P-~(ó - B q) and Y- P~q .
where ~ can be chosen arbitrarily. The solution (p,y) is a point in
V iff ~) 0 and y-(B q) ) 0. Thus, imposition of regularity in
min n n
a given region Q in q-space yields ~-(Bq) ) 0 for all q E
min n n
Qmin'
This can be achieved by restricting the values of fixed
parameters only, since we have assumed that yn is non-random.
Truncation of the distribution of ~, is unnecessary. If, for instance,
Qmin
is some rectangle, 2n simultaneous linear inequality restrictions
on the coefficients in B and à'tn,0 result for each individual t. The
conditions to be imposed in estimation are then obtained as the
intersection of the inequalities for each individual.
To get some more feeling for these conditions, we look at a very




U't,0 -,y0 , fixed and independent of t. l
B1. Let
Vmin
be a'rectangle in (p,y)-space', i.e.
Vmin -{(p,Y); 0~ vR ~ pl~y C vu and v~ ~ p2~y C vu}.
Since it is assumed that p2 always exceeds 0 it is convenient to work
with the normalization p2 - 1. Vmin
can then be written as
Vmin- {(P1,Y); v~y ( pl ( vuy and vu1C y C v~l}-25-
A feasible Y- (~r1,D'2)' has to satisfy
ylpl} y2- y~ 0 for all (pl,y) E
Vmin'
Thus, ,y is feasible iff
,y2) vRl- ~1, ?l2~ vul- ~lv~~vu and ~2) v~l - ~Ilvu~v~.
Figure 3.1 presents the feasible area (FA) in (yl,y2)-space. In this
example (i.e. for this choice of B) the feasible area is non-empty for
every vu) v~~ 0.
Figure 3.1 The feasible area in Y-space
For each feasible ~ it is possible to derive the regular area in
(P1,Y)-space:
V~. -{(P1.Y) ~ Y1P1 t ó2 - y ) 0}.
The intersection of these V~'s is the regíon in (pl,y)-space, where
the indirect utility function behaves well for all y E FA:
V - n V~ .
,yEFA-26-
In Figure 3-2 V and
Vmin
are presented. Note that automatically V J
Vmin' but the figures show that V is much larger than
Vmin'
(One could
have chosen V instead of
Vmin
to begin with; this yields the same
region FA in y- space)
"~~~u
~u,~.~ pl
Figure 3.2 The minimal and the actual regular region in (pl,y)-space
B2. For fixed y2- y2 ~ and given pl, y, (p2- 1), ql and q2 with y- p'q,
we must find a feasible solution for yl from the demand system
ql - ól -(ltpl)-1{?11P1} ó2- Y} P1
q2 - ?l2 - (ltpi)-1{à'1Plt á2- Y} P2
This is a system of two linearly dependent equations in yl with a
unique solution:
X1- 91 ; P1(á2- q2).
The solution is feasible iff
and(Plt vu~vR)?l2 ) v~l- ql; Plq2 , and
(Plt v~~vu)ó2 ) vul- qlt plq2 .
If sample prices pl always exceed -v~~vu then it is possible to
guarantee the existence of a feasible solution for all (ql,q2,y) in
the sample by choosing y2 large enough.
B3. For given y, the regular region in q-space is given by
e~ - {(ql,q2) E R2 : q2 ~ ~2}.
Thus, regularity on some region
emin ~{(ql,q2) E RZ ; q2 C q2} is
guaranteed if y2 is restricted to values larger than q2.
Example 3~ Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)
Let v-(log pl,.. ,log pn)'. a-( al,.. ,an)'. P-(R1,.. ,Rn)', I' a
symmetric nxn-matrix with typical element ~i~. The expenditure function is
e (p,u) - exp {a(p) t u b(p)},
a,s.r
where a(p) - a~ t a'v t 1~2 v'I'v, and
b(p) - exp (~'v) .
(3.5)
The expenditure function is homogeneous in p if oc'i-1, Cc-O and p'i-0,
where e is an n-dimensional vector with unit elements.
The uncompensated demands are given by
s- a t I'v t~ {log y- a(P) } (3.6)
where s -( sl,...,sn)' , si being the i-th budget share.
The concavity condition for the expenditure function is-28-
c~o (3.7)
where C- I" t~ g' {log y- a(p)} - 0 t s s' ,with o- diag(s). Sufficient
conditions for C to be negative semi-definite are
(a) I' ~ 0 ; (b) log y~ a(P) ;(c) 0 C si~ 1(i-1,...,n). (3.8)
We introduce random preferences as follows:
at-atOtnt




Vmin- {(p'y) ; 0( v( v, 0~ y~ y}.
Condition (b) requires the following restriction on fixed parameters
and on the range of the random variables:
max (-n'v) ~ a0 - log y} min min- (at,Ov t 1~2 v'I"v)
Oww - t OCvw
We also have to impose condition (c). Rewrite (3.6) as follows:
s-(Z-pv')n t at Ot I'v t~{log y-~0 - at~Ov - 1~2 v'I'v} (3.9)
From this expression it is clear that (c) imposes a number of
additional linear restrictions on the range of the ~,'s. Thus, as with
LES and QDU, we find that the n's are confined to a polyhydron,
although it is a bit more difficult to characterize than previously.
B2. Let VQt-{(pt'yt'9t)} with ptqt-yt' Pt)0 and yt)0. n can be solved from
the linear system
st- ~I-g~t)~2 t at.Ot I'vti ~{log yt- a0- at.Ovt- 2 vtI"~t}
(3.~0)
n'~-0-29-
where st-(stl "" stn),' ~t-(~tl'" '~tn)~' sti-ptiqti,yt' ~ti-log pti
(i-1,..,n). Tk~e solution must satisfy condition ( 3.~). If O~st~i and
I'(0, a sufficient condition for this can be derived from (3.6):
1
-n'vt ( a0- log ytt at.Ovtf 2 vtI"vt (3.11)
Substituting the solution for r~ obtained from (3.10) in (3.11) yields
an intrícate condition on
(pt'yt'qt)' ~e fixed parameters must be
chosen so that this condition is satisfied for all t.
B3. The characterization of the area in quantity space where the system
can be well-behaved appears to be extremely difficult. In terms of
budget shares, such a characterization is substantially more
straightforward. For some purposes this may suffice.
0-30-
4- Rationin~if the re ime is exogenous
In this section, we consider the problem of an individual who
maximizes utility, facing not only the budget constraint, but also a given
set of equality constraints. This can be seen as an introduction to the
more realistic case of endogenous regimes: the individual faces a set of
inequalities; in the point of highest utility some will be binding and
others will not. In this section we assume that it is known in advance,
that the constraints on goods 1 through k are binding and the other
constraints are not. The number k and the order of the goods may vary
across individuals, i.e. different individuals may be rationed with
respect to different goods.
The individual solves the problem
Mq U~(qI.qII) s.t.
II
Y - PIqI } PIIqZI'
Here we have written q-(qÍ~qII)~' p-(PI'PII)~ ~d the constraints are
given by
qI - qI .
Starting from the indirect utility function va and corresponding
demand system F~ as in Section 3, the solution of this maximization
problem is found using the notion of shadow (or virtual) prices (see,
e.g., Neary and Roberts, 1980):
Find pIE Rk , y E R and qIIE Rn-k such that
r ((PI.PII).Y) E ~g
F8((PI,PII),Y) - (qI,qII)
Y - Y t (PI- PI)1qI
(4.1)
The optimal quantities, taking into account the constraints qI- qI, are
then given by
qII.- 31 -
For individual t with income yt, confronted with prices pt and
rationed quantities qlt, we want problem (4.1) to yield a unique and
feasible solution. This suggests the following three conditions.
C1. (Regularity in a minimal subset of (p,y)-space)
For all admissible W and all n E 4: V ~ V
gt(W.n) min'
This condition is exactly identical to condition B1 in the previous
section.
C2. ('External coherency')
Let VQt be a given subset of {(p,y,q) E Rnx R x Rn; p'q-y }.
Then for all admissible w and all (p,y,q) E VQt, there exists at least
one n E Q such that there are pI E Rk and y E R with
(ÍPI.PII).Y) E Vg't(W,Tt)
Fgt(W,n)((PI.PII).Y) - q
Y - Y t (PI- pI)~qI
This condition states that certain quantity vectors qII can be optimal for
given prices, income and rationed quantities qI. If no measurement errors
are present, VQt must at least contain the observed vector
(pt'yt'(qIt'qIIt))
for the individual t. This condition is similar to
condition B2 in the previous section. It guarantees, once again, that each
data point has a non-zero likelihood contribution.
C3. ('Solvability')
Let VQt be a given subset of {(p,y,ql) E Rnx R x Rk}.
Then for all admissible W and all n E 52 and all (p,y,ql) E VQt, there
exist pI E Rk , y E R and qII E Rn-k such that-32-
( ((PI.PII).Y) E ~gt(w.n.)
Fgt(w.n)((PI.PII).Y) - (9I.qII)
I Y- Y t(PI- PI)1qI
Condition C3 states that for each admissible vector of parameters, (4.1)
must have a solution that is well-behaved. It is imposed to avoid the
problem encountered in Example 2.3. If there are no measurement errors on
prices, income or rationed quantities, then the set VQt must at least
contain the observed vector
(Pt'yt'qlt)'
The conditions have to be imposed for all individuals simultaneously.
Condition C1 is not necessary for internal coherency of the model with
rationing because it involves restrictions on actual prices, whereas for
the rationed commodities only shadow-prices matter. The condition is
important however when the model is used for simulations in which the
rationing is relaxed. Condition C3 is strongly related to the internal
coherency problem: It states that to each possible realization of ~ there
corresponds at least one vector qII of endogenous variables. Together with
the concavity of the expenditure function and convexity of Vg this implies




max U ( 9 9)- ÍÍ (q.-ó.)ai ÍÏ ( q.-ó.)ai s.t. y- P'q t P~ 9 8 I' II
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9i - áit ai(Y-PIqI-PII~II) , {Pi ~ aj} (i-ktl,....n). (4.2)
j-kt1
where y'II - (~ktl" . . '~n) ~ .
Alternatively, (4.2) can be obtained by first solving the
shadow prices (pl,...,pk)' from the first k unconditional demand
equations, with pI replaced by pI and y replaced by y, yielding
n




Y - Y t ~ (Pj- pj)'qJ j-1
and next substituting the solution into the notional demand equations for
goods k41 through n, again with pI replaced by pI and y replaced by y.
The solution is feasible iff ql~~rl and q2)~II,
or, equivalently, pI~O,
pII~O,
and Y- PI~I- pIIyII~ 0'
Note that equation (4.1) has exactly the same functional form as the
notional demand functions (3.2), the only difference being that ai is
replaced by ai~ {ak}lt...t an} and y is replaced by y-pÍql, and that (4.1)
does not depend on (al,...,ak) nor on (yl,...,~k). If all indivíduals are
rationed with respect to the same goods, one might simply impose the
conditions B1 - B3 described in the previous section, with y replaced by
y-pÍql
and y replaced by
YI1- (~k.l'" "~n)~'
Conditions C2 and C3 can be elaborated as follows:
C2. Let VQt -{(Pt,Yt,qt)}, with pt) 0 and yt- Pt4t.
Solving ~ from (4.2) yields
Yit- qit- ~ai,pit
(i-ktl,...,n) for some arbitrary ~) 0. (4.4)
The solution is feasible if ~i( qi (i-1,...,k).
4 has to be large enough to contain at least one value of ~, such that- 34 -
ót- ift ~' T1 satisfies (4.4) and is feasible.
Note that this condition is similar to the corresponding
condition B2 for LES in Section 3. It is weaker because the quantities
ql,...,qk do not have to be rationalized.
C3. Let VQt - {(Pt,Yt,qlt)}.
Existence of a feasible solution for given
~-(YI,~II)
means
qIt) YI and Y- PItqIt- pIIyII ~ 0'
Substitution of y- yt Ot ~, yields k}1 inequality restrictions on ~,
that restrict the set 4.
Example 2: QDU
We assume that no rationing applies to the quantity of the n-th commodity,
i.e. the commodity which was treated differently from the
commodities in Section 3.
Solving









with obvious partitioning of y and B.
The solution is feasible iff (qI,qII) is in the regular area of q-space,
i.e. iff
YIIB22pII - Y } qI {PI-B12B22PII} ~ 0 .-35-
Note that (4.5) has exactly the same functional form as the notional
demand functions, the only difference being that y is replaced by
y-pÍqII,
ó bY (?lII-B12qI), B bY B22 and P bY PII-
The elaboration of conditions C2 and C3 is similar to the previous
example:
C2. Let VQt -{(pt,Yt,qt)}, with pnt) 0 and
yt- ptqt.
Solving y from (4.5) yields
~II- B12qIt; B22qIIt- ~tpIIt'
where
~t- (-~tn,0} ~B12q1t4 B22qIIt~n},Ptn~
The solution is feasible iff ~t) 0.
(4.6)
(4-7)
52 has to be large enough to contain at least one value of ~, such that
yt- yt,0; n is feasible and satisfies (4.6), with a given by (4.7).
C3. Let Vet - {(Pt'yt'qIt)}'
Existence of a feasible solution for given y -(7lI,yII) means
yIIB22pIIt - yt} qlt{PIt-B12B22pIIt} ~ 0
Substitution of y- yt Ot ~ yields an inequality restriction on ~, that
restricts the set 4.
Example 3. AIDS
The shares for this specification are given by (3.9). The equation
EB(W,T1)((PI.PII),Y) - q
can be written as follows:- 36 -
s-[I-(3v' ]~ t at C; ['v t~3{log y- ocC- at'Cv - 2 v'iv}, (4.8)
where
v-(~Í.~ÍI)'. ~I-(~1' ,~k)'. ~i-1oB Pi (i-1,. ,k).
s-(si'sÍI)''
sI-(sl,..,sk) ' si-piqi,y
(i-1,..,k). It is impossible to derive an
analytical expression for shadow prices pI from (4.8). Numerical methods




as in Example 3.3. The condition states that
(4.8) (with ( p,y,q) replaced by
(Pt'yt'qt))
must yield at least one
feasible solution for (~,,pl). Since (4.8) is strongly non-linear in
plthis condition can only be checked numerically. Note that it is a
weaker condition than condition B2 because the quantities qI do not
have to be rationalized.
C3. Because of the intricate way in which pl enters (4.8), virtuslly
nothing can be said about this condition analytically. In specific
examples, for given values of the fixed parameters. numerical methods
might prove useful.- 37 -
5. Rationing if the regime is endogenous
In this section we consider the problem of an individual who
maximizes utility subject to a set of linear inequality constraints.
Common examples are the case of non-negativity constraints (see, e.g.,
Wales and Woodland, 1983, Lee and Pitt, 1986, Ransom, 1987, Van Soest and
Kooreman, 1987) and the kinked budget set in labor supply models ( Hausman
(1981, 1985), Moffitt, 1986, Blomquist, 1983). In contrast to the
discussion in the previous section, we now assume it is not known in
advance which constraints are binding and which are not. The 'regime',
i.e. the way constraints are split up between binding and non-binding
ones, is therefore endogenous.
The utility maximization problem in its primal form can be written as
Max U9(q) s.t. R q ~ r,
q -
(5.1)
where R is a kxn-matrix and r E Rk.
Here k is the number of restrictions, including the budget constraint.
Specific choices of R and r yield the examples referred to above:
Example a: non-negativity constraints: q~ 0,
budget constraint: p'q ( y.
So k-n;1, R-(p,-I)' and r-(y,0,...,0)'.
Example b: kinked budget constraint: c C wjh t yj (j-1,...,m),
time constraints: h~ 0 and h C T.
(notation as in Section 2.1; note that q-(c,h)' )
So k-mt2. R~ - (-w . .-w -O1 O1 ) , r - ÍY1~...,ym,O,T)'
1 ' m
If the utility function is strictly quasi-concave on the convex set
{qERn; Rq ( r}, the solution of the maximization problem can be found
using the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the
maximization problem are as follows:-38-
If q is optimal, then there exists a vector á E Rk such that
R q C r ,
- (5 2)
á' (R q- r) - 0 , and
(~Ug~~q)(q) - R'á .
This can be rewritten employing the correspoiiding ( homogeneotis of degree
zero) demand system FS(p,y). This demand system has the properties
(~Ug~~q)(FB(p,y)) - up for some k) 0, and
P~Fg(P.Y) - Y.
Making use of these properties and substituting ~-~~K, ( 5.2) can be
written as
(5.3)
(Because the demand system is homogeneous of degree zero and ~~ 0(non-
satiation), some normalization on ~ may be added)
R'a and r'a can be interpreted as a vector of shadow prices and shadow
income respectively.
To illustrate the general nature of (5.3), we elaborate (5.3) for the
two examples given above.
Example a (continued)
(5.3) Yields ~) 0, p'q ~ y, - q ~ 0, and
q - Fg({alp-(~2,...,~nf1)~}'~1Y)'-39-
Monotonicity of the utility function in at least one of the goods implies
that the budget constraint is binding, so al~ 0. We can choose the
normalization a1- 1 and this yields, with
~-(~2,...,~nt1)':
~ ~ 0, P~9 - Y, 9 ~ 0, and
9 - F~(P'~. Y).
This is the well-known result that shadow-prices (p-á) cannot exceed real
prices (p).
Example b (continued)
(5.3) yields ~) 0, c~ wjh 4 yj (j-1,...,m), -h C 0, h~ T and
m m m
(h c)~ - F~((- ~ wjaj- ~m}lt ~m}2. ~ aj)', ~ ajYj t T~m}2)
j-1 j-1 j-1
Monotonicity in c implies that ~lt...t~m is positive and allows the
normalization ~lt...tam- 1. Thus we have
a) 0, alt...tam- 1, c C wjh t Yj (j-1,...,m), 0( h( T and
m m
(h,c)~ - Fg((- ~ wj~j- ~m}1. ~m}2. 1)~, ~ ~jYj t T~m}2)
j-1 j-1
If all tax-brackets consist of more than a single point, then at most two
restrictions can be binding at the same time. This means that there are
only 2mf1 regimes: m regimes with one binding constraint and mtl regimes
with two binding constraints (m-1 kink points and two corners).
In the case of one binding constraint, say the j-th (jE{1,...,m}), we
have
(h.c)' - Fs((-wj.l)~.Yj) (~j-1)
and in case of a kink point, say between brackets j and jtl
(jE{1,...,m-1}), we have-40-
(h,c)' - Fg((-wja~-wj}1[1-a~J.l)'.Yjaj4yj}1[1-ajJ) - Fg((-w,l)~.Y )
This is a familiar result: The shadow wage w lies somewhere between the
wage rates wj and wj~l and shadow income y satisfies
ytwh-yjtwjh-yj}ltwj}lh, where h is the number of hours at the kink point.
The two corners yield similar results.
0
Let us now consider conditions one may want to impose, in order to
guarantee that (5.3) yields well-defined solutions. First of all, B1 may
be imposed once again, although it should be realized that in the present
context not only actual prices but also shadow prices matter.
Correspondingly to B2 we can impose a condition stating that it must
at least be possible to rationalize a given set of restrictions and
quantities per individual:
D2. ('External Coherency') Let RQt be a given set of restrictions
(including the budget constraint) and quantities that satisfy these
restrictions. For all t, y~ and (R,r,q) E RQ there exists some n E S2
such that there is a vector a E R~ with ~) 0 and q-
Fgt(W.n)(R'a,r'~).
Operationalization of this condition for a given demand system may be
difficult.
The most important condition, of course, is a condition which
guarantees that problem (5.3) has a well-defined solution. It is well-
known that this is the case if the objective function maximized is
strictly quasi-concave and the constraints define a convex set. Convexity
of the choice set is already clear from the general set-up in (5.1).
Quasi-coticavity of the utility function on the budget set is easily
g-uaranteed by imposing condition B3 and taking
Qmin
large enough to
contain (the upper edge of) any budget set over which the utility function
should be maximized. We will refer to this as condition D3. Note that this
condition is sufficient but not necessary to guarantee internal coherency.
The condition implies regularity at a~ point of a given region in q-space
(and thus invertibility of the demand system on that region), whereas
internal coherency only implies regularity at those points in q-space that
are optimal for some r~ E 4.- 41 -
Example 1: LES
We confine ourselves to the discussion of condition D3. Bearing in mind
that the condition must hold for each individual t, we omit the subscripts
t. In Section 3.3 it was shown that regularity at a given point q in
quantity-space means q) y. Condition D3 therefore implies
y C q for each q with R q C r.
This implies, for given systematic part y0 of ,y, truncation of the
distribution of ~,. In case of non-negativity constraints as well as in
case of a kinked budget constraint, this leads to imposition of
negativity of the yi's.
Example 2: DQU
As in the previous example, we confine ourselves to the discussion of
condition D3 and omit subscripts t. From Section 3.3 we know that
regularity at a given point q in quantity space is equivalent to
yn- (B q)n ) 0. (5.4)
Thus, condition D3 implies that (5.4) must hold for all q in the budget
set Q -{q E Rn; Rq ~ r}. This is achieved by restricting the fixed
min -
parameter yn:
yn ) max {(B q)n; R q t r}.
q
(5.5)
The maximum of the right hand side of (5.5) can be found by linear
programming. (The maximum exists if
Qmin
is compact).
In the special case of non-negativity constraints, assuming that all
prices are strictly positive, (5.5) yields
Yn ~ y max (j3nj~Pj).
l~jCn
In case of the kinked budget constraint (5.5) yields-42-
yn ~ max (1~21hjt I122cj).
OCjCm
where (hj,cj) (j-1,...,n) are the corners (h0,c0) - (O,yl) and ( hm,cn) -




ln the previuus secLions it has been shown that regularity cunditiuns in
some region
emin
in q-space for this demand system are very intricate
because shadow prices cannot be derived in closed form. Thus, in general,
no analytical results can be derived.
Example 4: Translog
In general, it is not possible to derive analytical expressions for shadow
prices for the Translog specification, so problems arise which are similar
to those encountered with AIDS. In the special case of non-negativity
constraints however, there is a way to avoid these problems. In this case
shadow prices corresponding to the optimal quantity vector are either real
prices (if qi)0 then pi-pi) or can be obtained froro a system of linear
equations (see e.g. Lee and Pitt (1986)). This result implies that it is
possible to guarantee internal coherency of the model without solving the
problem of deriving shadow prices at a~ point in some region in q-space.
This issue is discussed in Van Soest and Kooreman (1987), where sufficient
conditions for internal coherency are given which imply restrictions on
fixed parameters only (and no truncation of the distribution of r?). These
conditions are weaker than condition D3.
0-43-
6. Conclusions
The examples in Section 2 underline the necessity of the imposition
of coherency conditions in practice. Not only do we need parameter
restrictions to make sure that the model is internally coherent, we have
also seen that even if the true data generating process is coherent,
failure to impose appropriate conditions may yield inconsistent ML-
estimates of the parameters. These estimates would then make us believe
that the model is misspecified. This also illustrates the fact that it is
impossible to test the coherency conditions. The requirement of internal
coherency is after all a methodological one and not an empirical one.
If we would have tractable, flexible and globally concave functional
specifications for our demand systems the treatment of coherency
conditions would be straightforward. Since tractable, flexible systems
only have local concavity properties (the only globally concave flexible
system suggested by Diewert and Wales (1987) does not permit explicit
exppressions for the demand functions), the formulation and implementation
of parameter restrictions that guarantee regularity in some sense becomes
quite intricate.
There are two basic reasons for this. First of all the analysis in
Section 5 makes clear that we can guarantee well-behaved demand systems if
we can guarantee that the direct utility function is quasi-concave on the
budget set of an individual. Generally we do not want to impose this,
because in practice most of the budget set is irrelevant for the
individual anyway. Thus we are satisfied if the utility function is quasi-
concave in a part of the budget set where we most likely observe the
individual to be (so we can for instance generally ignore all interior
points of the budget set). By making the area where regularity conditions
are imposed as small as possible we maintain as much flexibility of the
functional form as we can. At the same time this complicates the analysis
because we have to think more carefully about the area where regularity
should hold. This for instance explains why conditions under exogenous
rationing may be different from the conditions under endogenous regimes.
The second essential complication arises because the budget set and
the parameters may differ across individuals. We have seen that certain
conditions, like "external coherency", suggest that the parameter space-44-
should not be too small, whereas other conditions suggest that it should
not be too large. These conditions may easily be conflicting.
Somewhat related to the previous points, the stochastic specification
tends to be difficult. In the examples considered the random variables
were usually constrained to a polyhedron. If, for instance, we would
specify a normal distribution for the random preferences, this would lead
to complicatecl truncations.
Another implication of the aualysis appears to be that for models
with endogenous regimes or corner solutions, one needs in general the
direct utility function in closed form. This is rather clear from the
analysis in Section 5, but also under exogenous rationing, conditions like
C2 or C3 require knowledge of shadow prices in a rationing point. Although
in principle one could compute shadow prices numerically whenever given i:~
implicit form, it is next to impossible to impose conditions like C2 or C3
when no closed form expressions for shadow prices are available. And, of
course, knowing shadow prices corresponding to given quantities amounts to
knowing the direct utility function. As a result, many of the popular
flexible forms like AIDS or Indirect Translog cannot be used in general.
In this paper we have illustrated the imposition of the various conditions
for some direct utility functions. There is one flexible form proposed by
Hausman and Ruud (~984), which has not been dealt with here. In a separate
paper (Kapteyn et al (1988)), we have used this system in a non-linear and
non-convex budget application and we have imposed concavity restrictions
along the lines set out in Section 4.
Altogether, the treatment of endogenous regimes or corner solutions
appears to require rather tedious procedures for the imposition of
regularity conditions and it severely limits the number of functional
forms that can be considered. Despite these difficulties, it should be
clear that withotrt the imposition of regularity conditions one will often
end up with a nonsensical model. Thus the choice appears between
complexity and incoherency.-45-
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